Along the same line, the Ministry of Defense emphasizes, in its Defence Vision 2035: Fighting for a safer future, the need for organizational decompartmentalization when countering hybrid threats in the information environment (Ministry of Defense Citation2020, 17) and promises to devote attention to the hybrid strategic competition between war and peace (Ministry of Defense Citation2020, 23). Policy Brief ; 39. For the JSCU it is shared with the corresponding official of the Ministry of Justice and Security. endobj This article provides a first step in closing that gap by offering a dedicated perspective on the organization of offensive cyber capabilities across three European countries. Cybersecurity scholarship has also investigated the organization of both military cyber entities (Pernik Citation2020, Smeets Citation2019) and offensive cyber capabilities (Smeets 2018). Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018. Register to receive personalised research and resources by email. /Length 186 hb``f``6d```\01G030000_ffcy5!ew3K 6 0 obj The United States Army War College educates and develops lead ers for service The organizational separation contains multiple ambiguities. How do I access the full text of journal articles ? endstream endobj startxref /Contents [7 0 R 8 0 R 9 0 R] It further details how each of the Office of Naval Research's (ONR) six Integrated Research Portfolios (IRPs) address the priorities for their respective naval domain customers. The vision is anchored on a three-pronged approach of readiness, capability and capacity, and spans all aviation-related platforms and weapons. This is not least important in the context of a new EU Strategic Compass that aims at expanding the unions capacity to tackle cyber threats, disinformation and foreign interference (European Union External Action Service Citation2022, 7), and a new Strategic Concept for NATO stating that cyberspace is contested at all times. JSCU is a collaboration between the two Dutch intelligence and security services the MIVD and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. As paradigmatic cases they were not chosen because of e.g. The selection of the three countries rests on a combination of pragmatic reasoning in terms minimizing the language barrier and achieving access to interviewees, and the fact that the countries represent a large-, a medium-, and a small-sized European country with ambitious cybersecurity policies and long-term publicly declared ambitions of developing offensive cyber capabilities. xmAN0Es 9viAHH&b:.$gcoO2wv$-q(3%S.PB4JX-qX3svv==Pr@YCRLKJ"ib5s@'DB&r]~OSu\Yyd9SB,-Oxot.s l[3`gvnal?8f,^OiV"2v(q$ Bb They suggest that strategy must be unshackled from the presumption that it deals only with the realm of coercion, militarised crisis, and war in cyberspace (Harknett and Smeets Citation2022, 2). x[sSL%bp J+)YMA(e} UN_N?>3|6*gO|_Vm9^vrq]~uVz^g. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 2017. /Pages 2 0 R Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy. << Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. B-1110 Brussels , 8 Fleet Secure Endpoint - installation and use 30 - Dashboard and alerting 30 - Fleet Secure Endpoint use in context 31 9 Cyber security, Crew Training and Awareness 32 10 Fleet Secure Endpoint - real case studies 34 11 Conclusion and Next Steps 36 White Paper Cyber security requirements for IMO 2021 CYBER SECURITY These elements hold the promise to decrease the risks that operational capability and activity are mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, and that political decision-making is hampered, and democratic oversight is disadvantaged. 58% of ransomware victims paid a ransom last year, up from 45% in 2019 and 38% in 2017. 245 0 obj <>stream /MediaBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] %PDF-1.7 % The development and deployment of these cyber capabilities weave together strategic guidance, legal mandate, doctrinal procedures, human skills, technological capacity, and organizational arrangement (see also Slayton Citation2017, Smeets Citation2022). The analysis of the Dutch organization of cyber capabilities shows organizational separation between the DCC which can deploy cyber capabilities in the event of armed conflict and war and the intelligence services that can deploy cyber capabilities for intelligence and active defense purposes. 10 Except for the French Ministry of Defense. >> By U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Commonwealth Heads of Government (20 April 2018), United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (February 2018), US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, (16 March 2017), Department of Defense, United States (April 2015), 112th Congress (2011-2012), Senate Bill 3523 (H.R. The guide shows what telework capabilities exist across the Navy for military and civilian personnel. Moreover, it spurs the risk that the operational capability and activity of intelligence and military entities are mismatched with the broader strategic or governance goals. /CreationDate (D:20150518000000-07'00') INFO: James A. Lewis, director of the Technology and Public Policy Program, testified before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, on "Securing Americas Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012. The release of this strategic plan marks the five-year anniversary of Navy Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet. Drawing out these three models of organizing cyber capabilities and their dominant characteristics, should be considered a starting point for further explorations and discussions of how European countries can and ought to organize their cyber capabilities across intelligence and military entities. Japan, Australia, Canada, and the U.K. are . This report is the Department of the Navy (DON) 30-year shipbuilding plan for the FY2022 Presidents Budget (PB2022). They argue that strategic outcomes in, through and from cyberspace are possible short of war (Michael and Harknett Citation2020, 1). Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. The cornerstone of French cyber defense is The National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI). While the Dutch model strongly notes the need for collaboration between the DCC and the intelligence services, it remains ambiguous how they complement each other in practice and how organizational collaboration is supposed to fulfill goals of increased effectiveness, synergy, and flexibility. In the face of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. How do I access the full text of journal articles ? 9/6/2017 11:24:25 AM . TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) Abstract. Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. NATO tailors its engagement with partner countries on a case-by-case basis, considering shared values, mutual interest and common approaches to cyber defence. There is hence a risk that many of the challenges to collaboration are internalized. /Resources 10 0 R The rapid development of cyber threats and intelligence challenges the traditional design of static cyber defense platforms. << Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson released 'A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0,' Dec. 17, 2018. The aim of this strategy is to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. Modly outlines the strategy for how the Department of the Navy will achieve the goals set forth in Education for Seapower. The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. An official website of the United States government, Department of the Navy Cyberspace Superiority Vision, Climate Action 2030 Department of the Navy, VA Vet Center (Supports vets, service members, and their families), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, One Navy-Marine Corps Team: Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy, eport to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022, After compiling and analyzing feedback from hundreds of Sailors through focus groups and surveys, Task Force One Navyin early 2021 submitted its final report, Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review, Comprehensive Review of the DON Uniformed Legal Communities, Department of the Navy Strategic Guidance FY 2020, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of the Navy's New Education Initiatives, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Version 2.0), Navy Leader Development Framework (Version 3.0), Readiness Reform Oversight Committee: One Year Later, Naval Research and Development: A Framework for Accelerating to the Navy and Marine Corps after Next, Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework, US Fleet Cyber Command/ Tenth Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, New Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision Released, SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review Letter, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 2020, Laying the Keel: Developing the Backbone of Our Navy, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at JFK Christening, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at Navy Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, The President's Coronavirus Guidelines for America, US Navy Hospital Ship Leadership Biographies, Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy, Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. Arguably, the strict French division between defensive and offensive measures is being challenged by increased coordination and collaboration across defense, intelligence, and military institutions. . While we have seen a proliferation of military cyber commands among NATO members in the past decade (Pernik Citation2020; Smeets Citation2019), the military involvement in cyber affairs is often justified with reference to the permanence of cyberwar on the political side. Yet, the Ministry does neither elaborate further on the relationship between intelligence and military operations nor what the internal organizational diagram looks like. /Filter /FlateDecode The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2019a, 19) describes it in the following way: The responsibility for network intelligence operations and offensive cyberoperations are with the Intelligence Service. endobj /Subject () /Rotate 0 The study team developed a series of observations and recommendations for continuous learning throughout the naval services. While future research could examine these and other explanatory factors, it is paramount that researchers and policy makers devote greater attention to the organizing of cyber capabilities, including the operational and strategic implications of the organizational divergence across NATO and EU members. This creates risks that operational capability and activity may be mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, that political decision-making is hampered, and that democratic oversight is hindered. BAE Systems is developing cyber defense capabilities to help aircraft detect and mitigate cyber attacks in real time. /Type /Page Preparing for Cyber Conflict : Case Studies of Cyber Command. The National Fleet Plan identifies U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard authorities, methods, and measurements to avoid redundancies and achieve economies of scale. This applies to coping with the challenges of persistent cyber conflict short of war as well as the application of cyber operations in armed conflict. Cyber Defence: Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are becoming ever more frequent. Cyber Offense in NATO: challenges and Opportunities, Cyber Conflict Short of War: A European Strategic Vacuum, The Ontological Politics of Cyber Security: Emerging Agencies, Actors, Sites, and Spaces, Cyber Conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden Dangers in the American Military Solution to a Large-Scale Intelligence Problem, Structuring the National Cyber Defence: in Evolution towards a Central Cyber Authority, Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale, What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Educating the civil aviation workforce . The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. Following the same line of thinking, this article offers a comparative exploratory qualitative analysis (Yin Citation2014) of how the development and deployment of cyber capabilities are structured across military cyber commands and foreign intelligence services in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. This was recently recalled, and contrasted with the Anglo-Saxon model, in the landmark 2018 Cyber Defense Strategic Review, drawn up under the authority of the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (SGDSN). In the face of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. This document, signed by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and all three military service secretaries, outlines the Department of Defense's commitment to residents of military housing and their rights as tenants. /Annots [11 0 R] TheNavy Aviation Vision 2030-2035reflects key concepts to meet CNOs vision of a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal and non-lethal efforts from near and far, on every axis and in every domain. Brussels Summit Declaration. Like many companies and organizations across the world, the Navy is facing threats from both individual "lone-wolf kind of actors" and attacks from nation-states, said Vice Adm . Consequently, the paper neither provides an exhaustive conceptualization of the organization of cyber capabilities, nor a set of fully fledged policy prescriptions of the requirements for intelligence services or military cyber commands to conduct specific cyber operations. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. The French Military Cyber Strategy that so far consists of three separate documents: the Ministerial Policy for Defensive Cyber Warfare, the Public Elements for the Military Cyber Warfare Doctrine, and the Public Elements for Cyber Influence Warfare Doctrine (Ministre des Armeses Citation2019a, Citation2019b, Citation2021) does, however, not elaborate on the collaboration between the COMCYEBR and the intelligence services. Nurturing such debate is crucial to achieve the best decisions about how to organize and develop cyber capabilities, how to use it, and how to secure transparency and accountability. Consequently, also in the French case, it is ambiguous how the entities complement each other in practice, and how the desired organizational collaboration will achieve impact. Existing scholarship has documented how European countries (Liebetrau Citation2022) and NATO (Jacobsen Citation2021) struggle to address such cyber aggressions below the threshold of war. With the 2013 military programming law, the French defense saw the establishment of the first real operational cyber defense chain (Gry Citation2020). endobj Comprehensive review of Department of the Navy Uniformed Legal Communities from SECNAV Executive Review Panel, Dec. 9, 2019. % Delerue (Citation2020); Haataja (Citation2019); Roscini (Citation2014) and Schmitt (Citation2017)), 5 See the website of the Dutch Ministry of Defence: https://english.defensie.nl/topics/cyber-security/cyber-command. stream This document contains the official biographies of the leadership for USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort as of 2020. That standup reflected Navy's prescient appreciation for a necessary confluence of critical mission sets. >> The attack made Colonial Pipeline a company. it is, according to the Ministry of Defense, neither necessary nor desirable to create a cyber command outside the Intelligence Service. Russias Cyber Policy Efforts in the United Nations, Already in a Cyberwar with Russia, NATO Must Expand Article 5 to Include Cyberwarfare, Cyber Defence in NATO Countries : Comparing Models, NATOs Needed Offensive Cyber Capabilities, Cyber Conflict Uncoded : The EU and Conflict Prevention in Cyberspace, National Cyber Security Organisation : Czechia, NATO in the Cyber Age : Strengthening Security and Defence, Stabilizing Deterrence, Cybersecurity of NATOs Space-based Strategic Assets, Huawei, 5G, and China as a Security Threat, Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATOs Cyber Policy, Preparing for Cyber Conflict : Case Studies of Cyber Command, Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities, Initial Reference Architecture of an Intelligent Autonomous Agent for Cyber Defense [9 September 20169 February 2018], Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority : Command Vision for US Cyber Command, Mutually Assured Disruption : Framing Cybersecurity in Nuclear Terms. It is the DONs responsibility to ensure our systems are secure, our infrastructure and weapon systems are survivable, and our cyber operators can strike in and through cyberspace at a time and place of the commanders choosing. NATO Headquarters hkkH|d~HRhmUdc+llb7,B4sn3s9c%LidC309O/Im-^#Zl# >> The depiction of cyberspace as a warfighting domain contributed to developing the role of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces in cybersecurity matters. This Arctic Strategic Outlook describes the United States Navy's strategic approach to protect U.S. national interests and promote stability in the Arctic. The Unmanned Campaign Plan represents the Navy and Marine Corps strategy for making unmanned systems a trusted and integral part of warfighting. endobj /Length 260 Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identifies three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. However, the Ministry does not elaborate on how the coordination between the intelligence service and the operational headquarters plays out or what it exactly entails. The EU's Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade. Defensive Cyberspace Operations, to defend DOD or other friendly cyberspace.